How Entra Private Access Can Stop Hotel Hackers
Checking-in to your hotel soon? You may have read recently that hackers have unleashed a campaign against various hotels, resulting in compromise of work accounts. In this attack, hackers take advantage of manipulating users into providing their credentials and hijacking their session. Albeit this is nothing new, it is a reminder that strong authentication and security throughout the pipeline is crucial to ensure a user's security. What is different however, is Microsoft Entra Private Access. In this article, I'll explain what happened, and how Entra Private Access could've protected these end users.
What Happened?
On July 24th, a report from BleepingComputer
highlighted that various hotel chains have become victim of attackers
compromising Microsoft 365 accounts through DNS Poisoning. Attackers first
gained admin access to hotel or conference-center Wi-Fi appliances through
exposed management interfaces, weak or reused credentials, and unpatched
firmware. Once they were in, they could modify the DNS settings for every guest
device. Next, attackers changed the gateway's DNS resolver so that legitimate
Microsoft domains resolved to attacker-controlled domains. So for example, if a
user typed login.microsoftonline.com
they were silently redirected to the attackers server which had a
like-for-like copy of the login screen. From here users were compromised
through the following attack paths:
- Standard
credential harvesting - hackers steal the username and password, which can
be dangerous for organizations that do not have Multifactor Authentication
enabled.
- Device
Code flow abuse (more dangerous) - some victims were redirected to a fake
Microsoft page prompting them to to approve a device-code login. Because
of this, attackers were able to bypass MFA and were issued a legitimate
OAuth token that could be used for further escalation.
- For some lucky users (sarcasm) they were also victims of Web Proxy Auto-Discovery, which allowed for the interception of ALL web traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy. So not only did their M365 account become compromised, but so did everything they did during their use.
As I said, compromises of hotel and conference centres are
nothing new. We all remember the AGM Hotel hack, the Marriott hack, and the
list goes on. One thing that no one talks about is how we secure users in our
organization from the outset so that when these things happen, they're already
secure. If we keep pointing fingers at the hotel chains and expect them to
fully protect us from compromise, are we actually providing defense in depth? I
don't think so. That is where Microsoft Entra Private Access does great things
for your users who are using public networks.
How Entra Private Access Could Have Prevented This
Microsoft Entra Private Access (EPA) introduces a Zero Trust network layer that
fundamentally changes how devices connect to corporate and SaaS resources.
Instead of trusting the local network, which is exactly what the attackers
exploited- EPA brokers every connection through an identity‑anchored tunnel.
This means the hotel’s DNS, proxy, or gateway never sees or influences your
Microsoft 365 traffic.
Here’s how EPA breaks the attack chain:
In short, Entra Private Access removes the weakest link: trusting
the network. Whether your users are in a hotel, airport, or coffee shop,
their authentication and data flows remain inside a verified, encrypted channel
tied to their identity and device posture.
How to Protect Your Users with Entra Private Access
Entra Private Access isn’t just another Zero Trust buzzword
— it’s a practical control that directly breaks the attack chain used in these
hotel Wi‑Fi compromises. Here’s how organizations can implement it effectively.
1. Deploy the Entra Private Access Connector
To begin, deploy the EPA connector inside your environment.
This establishes the identity‑anchored broker that all traffic will route
through.
- Install
the connector on a Windows Server host
- Register
it with your Entra tenant
- Ensure
outbound connectivity to the Entra edge
- Validate
that the connector is reachable from enrolled devices
This creates the foundation for private, brokered access.
2. Enroll Devices into Entra Internet Access and Private
Access
EPA works best when paired with Entra Internet Access (EIA).
Together, they provide:
- Secure
outbound internet access
- Brokered
access to SaaS apps
- Private
access to internal apps
- Isolation
from local DNS, proxies, and network manipulation
Enroll devices using:
- Intune
- Group
Policy
- Manual
installer (for unmanaged devices)
Once enrolled, the device stops trusting the local network
for DNS or routing.
3. Enable Private Access for Microsoft 365 Endpoints
This is the critical step that stops the hotel attack.
Configure EPA to broker traffic for:
- login.microsoftonline.com
- outlook.office365.com
- graph.microsoft.com
- sharepoint.com
- teams.microsoft.com
When these endpoints are protected:
- DNS
is resolved inside the Entra fabric
- Authentication
traffic is isolated from public networks
- Fake
login pages become unreachable
- Device‑code
phishing fails due to token binding and CA policies
This is the exact control that would have prevented the
attack.
4. Enforce Conditional Access and Token Protection
EPA integrates tightly with Conditional Access. Enable:
- Phishing‑resistant
MFA (FIDO2, Windows Hello)
- Token
Protection (binds tokens to device + session)
- Compliant
device requirement
- Network
location = Entra broker only
Even if credentials are stolen, attackers cannot satisfy
these conditions.
5. Disable Legacy Device Code Flow
BleepingComputer's report highlights that attackers abused
Device Code flow to bypass MFA.
Mitigate this by:
- Disabling
Device Code flow for all users
- Allowing
exceptions only for managed devices
- Monitoring
OAuth token issuance in Entra logs
This closes the second attack path entirely.
6. Test EPA on Untrusted Networks
Before rolling out broadly, validate EPA’s protections:
- Connect
a test device to a guest Wi‑Fi
- Attempt
to access Microsoft 365
- Confirm
traffic is brokered
- Validate
DNS is resolved through Entra
- Attempt
to reach known phishing domains (they should fail)
This ensures your users are protected in hotels, airports,
cafés, and conferences.
Why This Matters
Organizations often focus on endpoint protection and MFA,
but network trust is still a blind spot. The hotel DNS poisoning
campaign proves that attackers don’t need to break encryption or bypass MFA;
they just need to control what your device believes is “Microsoft.” Entra Private Access closes that gap by ensuring that only
verified, brokered connections ever reach your cloud services.
Final Thoughts
This campaign is a reminder that Zero Trust isn’t just about identity, it’s about
transport. By adopting Entra Private Access, enterprises can protect
users wherever they connect, even on compromised networks. The next time
someone logs in from a hotel Wi‑Fi, their session should be brokered,
validated, and isolated- not left to chance.
Until next week admins!
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