How Entra Private Access Can Stop Hotel Hackers

Checking-in to your hotel soon? You may have read recently that hackers have unleashed a campaign against various hotels, resulting in compromise of work accounts. In this attack, hackers take advantage of manipulating users into providing their credentials and hijacking their session. Albeit this is nothing new, it is a reminder that strong authentication and security throughout the pipeline is crucial to ensure a user's security. What is different however, is Microsoft Entra Private Access. In this article, I'll explain what happened, and how Entra Private Access could've protected these end users.

What Happened?

On July 24th, a report from BleepingComputer highlighted that various hotel chains have become victim of attackers compromising Microsoft 365 accounts through DNS Poisoning. Attackers first gained admin access to hotel or conference-center Wi-Fi appliances through exposed management interfaces, weak or reused credentials, and unpatched firmware. Once they were in, they could modify the DNS settings for every guest device. Next, attackers changed the gateway's DNS resolver so that legitimate Microsoft domains resolved to attacker-controlled domains. So for example, if a user typed login.microsoftonline.com they were silently redirected to the attackers server which had a like-for-like copy of the login screen. From here users were compromised through the following attack paths:

  • Standard credential harvesting - hackers steal the username and password, which can be dangerous for organizations that do not have Multifactor Authentication enabled.
  • Device Code flow abuse (more dangerous) - some victims were redirected to a fake Microsoft page prompting them to to approve a device-code login. Because of this, attackers were able to bypass MFA and were issued a legitimate OAuth token that could be used for further escalation.
  • For some lucky users (sarcasm) they were also victims of Web Proxy Auto-Discovery, which allowed for the interception of ALL web traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy. So not only did their M365 account become compromised, but so did everything they did during their use.

As I said, compromises of hotel and conference centres are nothing new. We all remember the AGM Hotel hack, the Marriott hack, and the list goes on. One thing that no one talks about is how we secure users in our organization from the outset so that when these things happen, they're already secure. If we keep pointing fingers at the hotel chains and expect them to fully protect us from compromise, are we actually providing defense in depth? I don't think so. That is where Microsoft Entra Private Access does great things for your users who are using public networks.

How Entra Private Access Could Have Prevented This

MicrosoftEntraPrivateAccess (EPA) introduces a ZeroTrust network layer that fundamentally changes how devices connect to corporate and SaaS resources. Instead of trusting the local network, which is exactly what the attackers exploited- EPA brokers every connection through an identity‑anchored tunnel. This means the hotel’s DNS, proxy, or gateway never sees or influences your Microsoft365 traffic.

Here’s how EPA breaks the attack chain:

In short, Entra Private Access removes the weakest link: trusting the network. Whether your users are in a hotel, airport, or coffee shop, their authentication and data flows remain inside a verified, encrypted channel tied to their identity and device posture.

How to Protect Your Users with Entra Private Access

Entra Private Access isn’t just another Zero Trust buzzword — it’s a practical control that directly breaks the attack chain used in these hotel Wi‑Fi compromises. Here’s how organizations can implement it effectively.

1. Deploy the Entra Private Access Connector

To begin, deploy the EPA connector inside your environment. This establishes the identity‑anchored broker that all traffic will route through.

  • Install the connector on a Windows Server host
  • Register it with your Entra tenant
  • Ensure outbound connectivity to the Entra edge
  • Validate that the connector is reachable from enrolled devices

This creates the foundation for private, brokered access.

2. Enroll Devices into Entra Internet Access and Private Access

EPA works best when paired with Entra Internet Access (EIA). Together, they provide:

  • Secure outbound internet access
  • Brokered access to SaaS apps
  • Private access to internal apps
  • Isolation from local DNS, proxies, and network manipulation

Enroll devices using:

  • Intune
  • Group Policy
  • Manual installer (for unmanaged devices)

Once enrolled, the device stops trusting the local network for DNS or routing.

3. Enable Private Access for Microsoft 365 Endpoints

This is the critical step that stops the hotel attack.

Configure EPA to broker traffic for:

When these endpoints are protected:

  • DNS is resolved inside the Entra fabric
  • Authentication traffic is isolated from public networks
  • Fake login pages become unreachable
  • Device‑code phishing fails due to token binding and CA policies

This is the exact control that would have prevented the attack.

4. Enforce Conditional Access and Token Protection

EPA integrates tightly with Conditional Access. Enable:

  • Phishing‑resistant MFA (FIDO2, Windows Hello)
  • Token Protection (binds tokens to device + session)
  • Compliant device requirement
  • Network location = Entra broker only

Even if credentials are stolen, attackers cannot satisfy these conditions.

5. Disable Legacy Device Code Flow

BleepingComputer's report highlights that attackers abused Device Code flow to bypass MFA.

Mitigate this by:

  • Disabling Device Code flow for all users
  • Allowing exceptions only for managed devices
  • Monitoring OAuth token issuance in Entra logs

This closes the second attack path entirely.

6. Test EPA on Untrusted Networks

Before rolling out broadly, validate EPA’s protections:

  • Connect a test device to a guest Wi‑Fi
  • Attempt to access Microsoft 365
  • Confirm traffic is brokered
  • Validate DNS is resolved through Entra
  • Attempt to reach known phishing domains (they should fail)

This ensures your users are protected in hotels, airports, cafés, and conferences.

Why This Matters

Organizations often focus on endpoint protection and MFA, but network trust is still a blind spot. The hotel DNS poisoning campaign proves that attackers don’t need to break encryption or bypass MFA; they just need to control what your device believes is “Microsoft.” EntraPrivateAccess closes that gap by ensuring that only verified, brokered connections ever reach your cloud services.

Final Thoughts

This campaign is a reminder that ZeroTrust isnt just about identity, its about transport. By adopting EntraPrivateAccess, enterprises can protect users wherever they connect, even on compromised networks. The next time someone logs in from a hotel Wi‑Fi, their session should be brokered, validated, and isolated- not left to chance.

Until next week admins!

 

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Using Custom Connectors and Microsoft Graph API's to Manage Licenses in Power Automate - Part One

Using Power Automate to Update Contact Information

Using Custom Connectors and Microsoft Graph API's to Manage Licenses in Power Automate - Part Two